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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
form, is of unquestionable value in inducing arbitrators to act with
caution.
The accusation of judicial jealousy takes three major forms, it being
contended that courts have (1) substituted their judgment for that of the
arbitrator, (2) under the guise of necessity for construction of the contract,
usurped the arbitrator's function of interpretation, and (3) narrowed the
arbitrator's jurisdiction by requiring the clearest and broadest language
to justify a finding that he has any. This study examines the cases which
give rise to the charges, and concedes that a certain degree of judicial
hostility does exist.
Recent cases indicate a greater judicial regard for arbitration as a
method of settling disputes with more respect being afforded the determina-
tions of arbitrators even in cases where the reviewing court would have
reached a result different from that of the arbitrator. Despite ambiguous
and unclear language in a collective bargaining agreement, for example,
arbitrators' interpretations have been upheld as not modifying the terms of
the agreement.
Under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
provisions for arbitration contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
in industries affecting interstate commerce, are specifically enforceable. In
the Lincoln Mills case Mr. Justice Douglas found a federal policy requiring
enforcement of agreements not to strike and a duty vested in the federal
courts to fashion a remedy for the effectuation of this policy. Subsequent
federal court treatment in such cases indicates a conscious effort on the part
of the courts to fulfill their obligation in this regard without going beyond
the bounds of judicial review.
Judicial review has been treated in the article under a broad definition
of the term, so as to include its effect upon several phases of the arbitration
process. The object of the approach is to gain a full appreciation for the
scope of the court's exercise of the reviewing power. A final caveat for the
reviewing court is that it be willing to recognize that, despite differences of
method, an arbitrator is able to arrive at a just result.
WILLIAM M. BULGER
Legislation Editor
BILLS AND NOTES
NON-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, by William F. Wilier, 11 Syracuse L. Rev.
13 (Fall 1959).
Professor Willier examines and synthesizes over three hundred
decisions of American Courts pertaining to non-negotiable instru-
ments covering the period 1880 to 1958. The author formulates
generalizations as to the law of non-negotiable instruments and in
so doing has produced material which is unique. This article should
be of interest to the practicing bar as it furnishes material not
heretofore available.
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The purpose of the article is to survey the law of non-negotiable
instruments for comparison with that of negotiable instruments. Among
the topics discussed are the requirements for transfer of non-negotiable in-
struments, the rights and liabilities of the various parties to such instru-
ments, warranty liabilities of transferors, the various equities and defenses
attaching to transferred instruments, and severance of ownership and
waiver of defenses.
Professor Willier takes issue with the draftsmen of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for not adding certainty and uniformity to non-negotiable
instrument law by broadening the definition of Section 3-805 to include all
instruments resembling negotiable instruments insofar as they contain
promises or orders to pay money and are intended by the original parties to be
transferable, although deficient in meeting the formal requirements of
negotiable instruments.
RONALD E. OLIVEIRA
CONTRACTS
EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS NOT To COMPETE, by Harlan M. Blake, 73 Harv.
L. Rev. 625 (February 1960)
In this article Professor Blake begins with a historical dis-
cussion of the judicial treatment of covenants in which an employee
agrees not to compete with his employer after termination of the
employment. The author examines the present status of such agree-
ments and analyzes the factors determining their enforceability.
He suggests advice for counsel in drafting effective postemploy-
ment restraints for employees who during their employment have
access to valuable confidential information or have special rela-
tionships with clients with respect to whom the employer has a
dominant claim.
A foundation for an understanding of the modern law of postemployment
restraints is laid by comprehensively analyzing its history in England, using
as a focal point the landmark case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, in which the rule
of reason was formulated. The development of the law in America closely
parallels that in England. By the end of the nineteenth century the courts in
both countries had firmly settled on the reasonableness approach and completely
abandoned the mechanical distinction between general and partial restraints.
Recent developments in the law are considered, the article pointing
out the balancing of interests involved in formulating the permissible limits
of employee restraints. On the one hand, there is the potential social,
political, and economic harm that may result to the employee; on the
other, the necessity that business organizations be able confidently to
entrust important business information to certain employees. Most recent
cases impliedly require the employer to show special circumstances making
it unfair for him to bear all the risk of putting an employee in a position
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